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ABSTRACT 
 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have become a key technology for the IoT and despite obvious benefits, 
challenges still exist regarding security. As more devices are connected to the internet, new cyber attacks 
are emerging which join well-known attacks posing significant threats to the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of data in WSNs. In this work, we investigated two computational intelligence techniques for 
WSN intrusion detection. A back propagation neural network was compared with a support vector machine 
classifier. Using the NSL-KDD dataset, detection rates achieved by the two techniques for six cyber attacks 
were recorded. The results showed that both techniques offer a high true positive rate and a low false 
positive rate, making both of them good options for intrusion detection. In addition, we further show the 
support vector machine classifiers suitability for anomaly detection, by demonstrating its ability to handle 
low sample sizes, while maintaining an acceptable FPR rate under the required threshold. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Internet of Things (IoT) is expected to usher in an era of increased connectivity, with an 
estimated 50 billion devices expected to be connected to the Internet by 2020 [1]. At its core, the 
aim of the IoT is to connect previously unconnected devices to the Internet [2], thus creating 
smart devices capable of collecting, storing and sharing data, without human interaction [3]. 
These newly connected smart devices join previously connected traditional computing devices, to 
form a hybrid network known as the IoT.   
 
With the rapid growth of the IoT, and the technological development of sensors, Wireless Sensor 
Networks (WSNs) have become a key technology for the IoT [4]. These networks consist of self-
organized sensor nodes, communicating using a wireless medium and are used to perform 
distributed sensing tasks. The low cost nature and easy implementation has seen them deployed in 
a wide range of fields such as surveillance, climate change detection, environment monitoring, 
and numerous healthcare applications [5].  
 
Despite the obvious benefits, challenges still exist with respect to security in WSNs. This is 
largely due to the inherent nature of being deployed in harsh unattended environments, broadcast 
in nature, and having limited resources [6] [7]. To address these concerns, extensive research has 
been conducted into the use of cryptography, authentication, key management and secure routing 
in WSNs. Whilst the proposed security solutions have been found to reduce cyber attacks, they 
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have not eliminated them completely [8]. Well-known and new cyber attacks therefore remain a 
concern in WSNs, and are the rationale for this study. 
 
Computational intelligence provides comparatively low-cost technologies for developing IDSs 
while taking care of limited resource consumption. In this study, we applied two major 
computational intelligence techniques: feed-forward backpropagation multi-layer perception, and 
support vector machine (SVM) in WSN intrusion detection and accuracy recording. More 
specifically, our study compared the detection rates of Denial of Service (DoS) intrusions 
achieved by the two techniques. A public dataset is preprocessed, normalised and used as input to 
each network before detection rates and accuracy are compared. Based on our experimental 
comparison, we found that both techniques performed well, returning good true positive detection 
rates, while the SVM offered the better false positive rate. This demonstrates that both techniques 
could be used for establishing anIDS to reduce cyber attacks in WSNs.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents related work in this field. 
Section 3 discusses well-known cyber attacks faced by WSNs found in the IoT. Section 4 
describes common methods and approaches to detecting cyber attacks. Section 5 discusses 
artificial neural networks as a method for detecting cyber attacks. Section 6 discusses the use of 
Support Vector Machines as a method for detecting cyber attacks. Section 7 details the 
experimental setup used to provide a comparison between the detection rates of the feed-forward 
neural network and support vector classifier. The achieved results are presented in Section 8. 
Finally, Section 9 provides some concluding remarks with suggestions for future work. 
 
2. RELATED WORK 
 
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are by nature distributed, fault tolerant, scalable, and function 
without  a predefined infrastructure [5]. These attributes make it very difficult to design and 
maintain a WSN which is completely secure and resistant to threats from cyber attacks. Focus has 
therefore shifted to detecting threats in a timely manner to minimize their impact on the network. 
Various approaches to intrusion detection in WSN have been proposed including the use of 
Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) and Support Vector Machines (SVMs). In [9] a hybrid IDS 
using support vector machine and is proposed and designed to operate in cluster based WSNs. 
The SVM is trained using a distributed learning algorithm and returns high detection rates, with a 
low number of false positives recorded. In [10] the authors use a SVM for intrusion detection and 
use the Dynamically Growing Self-Organising Tree (DGSOT) clustering algorithm to enhance 
performance. They demonstrate the approach provides a significant improvement during the 
training process, outperforms the Rocchio Bundling technique, and offers good detection rates. In 
[11] new data preprocessing techniques are proposed and tested using various data mining 
algorithms, including SVM. In their results, the authors found the SVM classifier to offer the best 
performance (high accuracy) with minimum computational time required, when using datasets 
with sparse representation.  
 
Research has also been conducted into the use of artificial neural networks for intrusion detection. 
In [12] the authors propose an artificial neural network based intrusion detection system and test 
the system with 22 attack types found in the KDD99 data set. Their results show a 75% success 
rate for most attacks, although attacks with fewer samples return substantially lower rates. In [13] 
Genetic Algorithm-Levenberg-Marquardt Algorithm (GA-LMBP) is used for the first time in an 
WSN intrusion detection model. When compared with traditional models based on BP, it offers 
multilayer cooperative detection and a model of self-leaning with associative memory and fuzzy 
computing abilities, and offers higher true positive detection rates and lower power consumption. 
In [14] the authors use an enhanced Fuzzy Adaptive Resonance Theory (ART) neural network to 
detect threats in WSNs. The original model proposed in [15] was enhanced by training the 
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network to learn a time-series and detect time-related changes, resulting in higher accuracy rates 
when compared with the original. 
 
3. CYBER ATTACKS IN WSN 
 
Although cyber attacks facing WSNs are diverse, they can generally be classified as either active 
or passive attacks. Passive attacks do not characteristically impair a network or change data, but 
rather monitor targets for vulnerabilities or extract information from the network. Active attacks 
by contrast attempt to change data on or en route to a target, or deprive access to the network 
using various forms of denial of service (DoS) attacks. This section will discuss known active 
cyber attacks facing WSNs, used to change data or perform DoS attacks. 
 
• Hello Flood Attack: An attacker floods the network with Hello packets so nodes select 
the compromised node as a forwarder for their packets [16]. 
• Sybil Attack: A compromised node adopts the identity of several other nodes, or creates 
fake identifies with the intent of disrupting routing paths or data aggregation [17]. 
• Wormhole Attack: A malicious node advertises itself as having the shortest routing path 
to the base node.  All other nodes therefore select it as a forwarder for their packets, 
resulting in all traffic now passing through the malicious node and being tunneled 
through a private link to another location. 
• Sink Hole / Black Hole Attack: A compromised node advertises itself as having the 
shortest routing path to the base node [17].  All other nodes therefore select it as a 
forwarder for their packets, resulting in the creation of a sinkhole, and all traffic now 
passing through the compromised node. 
• Selective Forwarding Attack: A compromised node exploits inherent trust, whereby a 
compromised node refuses to forward certain packets and simply drops them. 
• Misdirection Attack: A compromised node forwards messages along incorrect paths, in 
an attempt to divert traffic away from its intended destination. 
• Desynchronisation Attack: Messages carrying sequence numbers are disrupted, 
misleading end nodes into thinking some frames have been missed and therefore 
requesting retransmission [16]. 
• SYN Flood Attack: A network is flooded with malicious SYN request packets creating 
copious half-open state connections between nodes. In the absence of required ACK reply 
packets, the nodes resources are exhausted and denial of service is achieved [18]. 
• Collision Attack: A compromised node transmits short noise packets when other nodes 
are already transmitting, causing a collision with a neighbouring node. 
• Exhaustion Attack: A compromised node repeatedly sends a RTS message, eliciting a 
CTS response, which if done continuously would eventually exhaust the resources of 
both nodes. 
• Unfairness Attack: Compromised nodes monopolise access to the channel, reducing 
window time for genuine data transmission. As a result, service although not entirely 
denied, is significantly degraded. 
• Tampering Attack: Malicious beacons are continuously sent to sensor nodes, keeping 
them active and preventing them from switching to sleep mode. 
• Battery Exhaustion Attack: Node resources are depleted due to prevention of sleep mode. 
 
4. INTRUSION DETECTION METHODS 
 
A single method of defense against cyber attacks is neither feasible nor possible. It is therefore 
advisable to compliment first line security mechanisms such as encryption, authentication and 
authorization with a second line of defense such as intrusion detection.  Here an intrusion can be 
classified as any set of activities that attempt to compromise the integrity, confidentiality or 
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availability of a resource. An intrusion detection system (IDS) addresses these directly by 
providing confidentiality; ensuring data is not disclosed to unauthorised individuals or systems, 
integrity; ensuring data is preserved in regard to its meaning, completeness and intended use, 
availability; ensuring the data and system are accessible to authorised individuals. 
Intrusion detection systems can be classified by two distinct methods, with a third hybrid 
approach also available which will be discussed below. 
 
Signature-based Detection. Also known as misuse or rule-based intrusion detection relies on 
known rules (signatures) of previous attacks and attempts to identify possible intrusions by 
comparing collected data against these predefined rules [19].   Data streams which match these 
predefined rules would be detected and identified as potential attacks invoking an alert. High true 
positive and low false positive rates are possible for known attacks, but conversely signature-
based detection offers low detection rates for zero day (new) attacks.  
 
Anomaly-based detection. Anomaly-based detection involves comparing current network traffic 
with a baseline of previously learnt normal network behavior [19]. The baseline is determined by 
monitoring the network and hosts during an extended period of activity, and building profiles of 
normal behaviour for each host or protocol. Any significant deviation from this baseline is 
detected and classified as an anomaly, raising an alert. In contrast to signature-based methods it 
offers good detection for new or unknown attacks, although it is often considered to produce a 
high false positive rate. 
 
Specification-based Detection.  Is a hybrid of signature and anomaly-based detection where 
specifications are developed to describe normal network behavior [20]. Two detection 
mechanisms are usually combined, one to detect known attacks using signatures, the other to 
monitor traffic and detect deviations from learnt normal network behaviour. Since specifications 
of normal behaviour are developed manually Low false positive rates can be achieved compared 
with anomaly-based detection methods.    
 
5. ARTIFICIAL NEURAL NETWORKS 
 
Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) are a method of machine learning commonly used for 
anomaly-based detection [21]. Interconnected neurons exchange information to estimate or 
predict outputs from supplied patterns of inputs. They are typically organized into layers, each 
consisting of a specified number of interconnected neurons. Patterns of data are supplied at the 
input layer, processed at the hidden layer using a system of weighted connections, before 
supplying an answer at the output layer as shown in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Neuron connections and information flow. 
 
The arrows represent connections between neurons and also indicate the direction or flow of 
information. Each connection has a weight (integer number) that controls the signal between the 
two neurons. If the output from the network does not meet the desired output, performance can be 
improved by iteratively updating the weights until it reaches an acceptable accuracy or until no 
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further improvement to the learning can be made. Figure 2 shows two ANN architectures which 
exist Feed-forward and Feedback networks. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Feed-forward and Feed-back network architectures [22]. 
 
In feed-forward networks information flow is unidirectional from input to output as shown in 
Figure 3.  Since feedback loops do not exist the output of any layer does not affect that same 
layer. Feed-forward networks are commonly used in pattern generation, recognition and 
classification. 
 
Figure 3. Feed-forward Neural Network Architecture. 
 
Feedback networks differ since feedback paths now exist allowing information to travel in both 
directions. Inputs to each neuron can now be modified meaning the state of the network is 
continuously changing and evolving, as shown in Figure 4. Feedback networks are commonly 
used for image captioning, speech recognition and motion detection. 
 
Figure 4. Feedback Neural Network Architecture 
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Both types of NN architectures share an ability to learn, but do so differently. Feed-forward 
networks require supervised learning, where the network is provided with the desired answer 
(output) to each given input and used to train the network to provide accurate future outputs. 
Feedback network instead utilise unsupervised learning where the desired output is not provided 
and instead the data is clustered based on relationships among the variables in the data. 
 
6. SUPPORT VECTOR MACHINE 
 
Support Vector Machine (SVM) is another a method of supervised machine learning which can 
be used an alternative approach to anomaly-based detection [10]. The SVM supervised machine 
learning algorithm is commonly used to solve complex classification problems, but supports both 
regression and classification tasks and can handle multiple continuous and categorical variables. 
In this method of machine learning the algorithm performs classification tasks by constructing 
hyperplanes in a n-dimensional space (where n is number of features you have) that separate 
cases of different class labels [23]. Classification is then performed by finding the hyper-plane 
that best differentiates the two classes. 
 
Figure 5. Feedback Neural Network Architecture 
 
In Figure 5, three hyper-planes exist (A, B and C). We see that hyper-plane A misclassifies the 
two classes, hyper-plane C offers a better accuracy of classification, and hyper-plane B offers the 
best classification of the two classes. 
 
Figure 6. Feedback Neural Network Architecture 
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In Figure 6, two hyper-planes exist (A and B). When both hyper-planes appear to offer good 
classification, SVM will consider the distance (margin) between the nearest data point (for both 
classes) and the hyper-plane to decided which plane offers the best classification [23]. SVM 
selects the hyper-plane which classifies the classes accurately prior to maximizing margin. The 
hyper-plane with the highest margin will then be selected. In Figure 6, hyper-plane B has the 
highest margin, however it has a classification error, therefore hyper-plane A will be selected. 
 
7. IMPLEMENTATION AND CONFIGURATION OF NETWORKS 
 
In this paper anomaly-based detection was chosen as a method of intrusion detection in wireless 
sensor networks. To test and compare detection rates, a Multi-Layer Perceptron Backpropagation 
Neural Network (BPN) was chosen from the architectures shown in Figure 2 and will be 
compared against a Support Vector Machine (SVM) Classifier. 
 
7.1. DATASET PRE-PROCESSING AND NORMALISATION 
 
In the absence of many credible public datasets with which to study network based anomaly 
intrusion detection many in the research community revert back to the popular KDDCUP’99 
dataset. The dataset however suffers from a number of problems highlighted by McHugh  [24] 
and was therefore discredited for use in this paper. An amended version (NSL-KDD) [25] was 
suggested to address some of these inherent problems and was subsequently chosen instead.  
Before the dataset could be offered to either network, data preprocessing and normalization was 
required to convert the raw input data into an appropriate format which the machine learning 
algorithms could use for subsequent analysis.  The creators of the NSL-KDD dataset had 
preprocessed the data in part by filling in missing values and removing redundant or duplicate 
records, therefore the final preprocessing step was to select the most relevant features.  The 
workflow proposed by Can et al. [12] was followed and 41 features reduced to 22 as follows:  
` 
(1,2,34,5,6,10,12,14,17,22,23,24,27,29,30,32,33,35,36,37,41) 
 
Three of the chosen features contained strings: Protocol (2) Service (3) and Flag (4) and therefore 
required to be converted from non-numeric qualitative data to numeric quantitative data to bring 
all variables into proportion with one another [26]. 
 
Finally, normalisation was required to scale all attributes into range [0,1] to achieve unity- based 
normalisation. This could be achieved with equation [13]: 
 
 
 
Using this method of min-max normalisation a value of zero can cause problems for some models 
since the highest and lowest values could remain the same [0,1] therefore Can et al used an 
arbitrary range between 0.1 to 0.9 and amended the equation as follows [12]: 
 
 
 
where  is each data point, is the minimum data point value, is the maximum data 
point value, and is the data normalized between 0 and 1.  It is also possible to use the 
following equation to achieve a more centralised set of normalised data, with zero being the 
central point.  
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7.2. NETWORK CONFIGURATION AND SIMULATIONS 
 
In this paper, NSL-KDDTrain+_20Percent dataset is selected to train and test the BPN. The 
MATLAB nprtool was used with the parameters shown in Table 1. The dataset contains four 
attack types (DOS, R2L, Probe, U2R) but for the purpose of this study, this was reduced to focus 
on only DOS attacks, of which six attack types were found (Smurf, Neptune, Back, Teardrop, 
Pod, Land). 
 
The NSL-KDDTrain+_20Percent dataset was also offered to the SVM classifier using MATLAB 
with the parameters shown in Table 2. The same six attack types used in the previous setup were 
again used to test intrusion detection rates (Smurf, Neptune, Back, Teardrop, Pod, Land). 
 
Table 1. Feed-forward Backpropagation Neural Network Configuration Parameters. 
 
Feed-forward Back Propagation Neural Network 
Network Simulator for Dataset MATLab nprtool 
Implemented Attacks Smurf, Neptune, Back, Teardrop, 
Pod, Land 
Dataset Samples 25192 
Number of Input and Output 
Layers 
22/1 
Network Type Feed-Forward Backpropagation 
Training Function TRAINLM 
Adaption Learning Function LEARNGDM 
Performance Function MSE 
Number of Layers 2 
Number of Neurons 20 
Transfer Function LOGSIG 
Epochs 100 
Min_Grad 1e-010 
 
Table 2. Support Vector Machine Configuration Parameters. 
 
Support Vector Machine Classifier 
Network Simulator for Dataset MATLab Classification 
Implemented Attacks Smurf, Neptune, Back, Teardrop, 
Pod, Land 
Dataset Samples 25192 
Network Type Support Vector Machine 
Preset Fine Gaussian SVM 
Kernel Function Gaussian 
Kernel Scale 1.2 
Box Constraint Level 1 
Multiclass Method Ove-vs-Ove 
Standardise Data True 
 
 
International Journal of Computer Networks & Communications (IJCNC) Vol.9, No.4, July 2017 
53 
8. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
To evaluate the two techniques compared in this study, we collected statistics on the True 
Positive (TPR) and False Positive rates (FPR) for all included attacks. The TPR can be calculated 
using   where True Positive (TP) denotes the number of attacks identified and 
False Negative (FN) denotes the number of attacks which were not detected.  
 
The FPR can be calculated using where False Positive (FP) denotes the number 
of attacks detected that were actually normal traffic and True Negative (TN) denotes when attacks 
do not exist and are therefore not detected.  
 
Test results for the BPN are shown in Table 3 and the confusion matrix in Figure 7. It can be 
clearly seen that the network returned good TPR for most attacks, all of which were above the 
desired 90% TPR (highlighted green). Neptune attacks for example had a TPR of 99.3%, since 
8240 samples were correctly detected, whilst 55 samples were incorrectly classified. Interestingly 
as the number of attacks samples decreased, it resulted in not only a decrease in the TPR but also 
an increase in the FPR. This is evident for the back and teardrop attacks which both had relatively 
small samples and returned FPRs of 7.8% and 2.8% respectively. Attacks with very few samples 
(pod and land) proved difficult to detect, with this method of anomaly-based intrusion detection. 
The results obtained were found to be comparable with those found in related research as 
described in [12] which found similar detection rates and relationship between low sample attacks 
and detection rates. 
 
Table 3. Back Propagation Neural Network Results. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Feedback Neural Network confusion matrix. 
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Test results for the support vector machine are shown in Table 4 and the confusion matrix in 
Figure 8. It can be clearly seen that overall the network performed comparatively with the BPN 
with good TPR for most attacks (highlighted green). Neptune attacks by comparison had a TPR 
of 99.2%, since 8223 samples were correctly detected, whilst 38 samples were incorrectly 
classified. Once again, though the data showed that the impact of having fewer attack samples 
was to decrease the TPR, it was however able to detect very low samples such as pod and land 
with TPR of 44.7% and 100% respectively. Interestingly it was also noted that overall the FPR 
was much lower than that of BPN and all remained below the desired 1% for attacks, suggesting 
less samples were misclassified. The results obtained were found to be comparable with those 
found in related research as described in [11] which found an SVM classifier to offer the best 
performance (high accuracy) in comparison to other data mining algorithms, when using the same 
NSL-KDD dataset.  
 
Table 4. Support Vector Machine results. 
 
 Support Vector Machine (SVM) Results 
Attack Sample True Positive Rate 
Detection Rate 
False Positive Rate 
  TP FN TPR FP TN FPR 
Normal 13449 13376 73 99.4% 104 13376 0.99% 
Neptune 8282 8223 59 99.2% 38 45 0.84% 
Smurf 529 519 10 98.1% 2  5 0.4% 
Back 196 165 31 84.2% 0 31 0% 
Teardrop 188 181 7 96.3% 0 7 0% 
Pod 38 17 21 44.7% 3 16 0.19% 
Land 1 1 0 100% 29 0 0% 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Support Vector Machine confusion matrix. 
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9. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this study, we analysed computational intelligence techniques for intrusion detection in WSNs. 
We reviewed major DoS attacks faced by WSNs and methods of intrusion detection. Finally, we 
carried out MatLab simulations to observe and evaluate the performance of an artificial neural 
network and support vector machine in detecting WSN intrusions. Our experimental studies 
demonstrated the promise of both computational intelligence techniques in effectively detecting 
intrusions. Both techniques returned good and comparable FPR results, however the support 
vector machine also further demonstrated its suitability for anomaly detection by handling low 
sample sizes better, while still maintaining an FPR rate under the 1% threshold. This would 
suggest for the dataset used (NSL-KDD) that the support vector machine proved to be the better 
technique for anomaly detection. 
 
The next step in our research will be to investigate threats faced by IP-based WSNs and develop a 
novel computational intelligence technique capable of detecting and predicting botnet DDOS 
activity in a physical WSN deployment. 
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